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Introduction
There is simply no doubt that any security features (functions) that may be proposed for open and distributed systems must themselves be reliable and enforced at all times. Security, in these terms, then consists of: q definition of security functions; and q evaluation of the associated mechanisms for consistent and reliable operation. Any evaluation of security functionality must contain an analysis of the security-enforcing features of the system under review. In the case of distributed systems this includes, among other requirements:
q evaluation of any data communications protocols used to provide the security functions specified (for consistency, continued enforcement of protection for the functions themselves, determination of any invalid behaviour under licit or illicit usage, and so on);
q assessment of the protection mechanisms available in the nodes/computers making up the distributed network, including both general purpose computers/workstations as well as lower layer service units such as "gateways", "routers", "bridges", etc., at the individual operating system level, including, in particular, protection of any network service facilities, (often referred to as "pervasive" security);
q assessment of the underlying computer hardware design supporting security services and their correct and continuous usage by the operating system. This article assesses these requirements in the light of over 25 years' experience in the industry in the design of computer hardware and system software required to provide and enforce security requirements. The need for multiple layers of security enforced by computer hardware is proposed in line with that earlier research. Current hardware and operating systems required to participate in such distributed computing systems environments may not meet these requirements, creating security exposures in distributed computing networks.
Protection Schemes -Hardware and System Software Levels
The Multiple Layer Protection Architecture -The Multics Project The "Multics" project began 30 years ago (1964) at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the USA in the same year that IBM introduced its industry defining System/360 computer series. One of the goals of the Multics project was to "serve as a foundation upon which persons other than the system designers could build complicated and sophisticated software subsystems" [1] . Organick goes further to describe the overall goal of the project in terms familiar today for the aims and goals of distributed systems, i.e.:
to provide multi-access computer use to a large community of individual problem solvers, teams of co-operating researchers, and/or (legitimately) competing entrepreneurs, by providing reliable processing power and storage that expands as required and in which information private to its users can be shared in a controlled manner [1] .
Essentially, Multics sets out concepts of controlled access to shared information, data and programs, through virtual memory schemes. These were first based around the General Electric GE-645 computer and, in particular, special protection hardware technology. This technology contributed to "compartmentalization" of information. Two basic structures were used which supported each other. The first was the "per-segment access control" and the second "concentric rings of protection". The first of these, access control on a memory segment basis, provided for user set rights for sharing information. By contrast, the protection ring structure gave "intraprocess protection of segments". This was seen as a generalization of the older, two layer "user/supervisor" separation concept whereby the segments comprising a particular software system could be associated with a set of protection rings each of which gave particular levels of privilege and protection. Entry to the various layers of protection afforded by the protection ring structure was by means of "gates" that could themselves be controlled by the system software. (Note that at the time, the overhead of crossing from one "ring" to another was of the order of a few milliseconds on the GE-645 hardware.)
It is interesting to note that the original Multics plan called for up to 64 rings of protection for categorizing various software components. Rings 0 to 31, for example, applied to system software, e.g. ring 0 for the "central supervisor", ring 1 for "administrative" segments, etc., while rings 32 to 63 could be used to characterize user subsystems and other user programs. In practice, Multics employed only eight rings with rings 0 to 3 for the system software and rings 4 to 7 for users.
Thus, in the mid-1960s, the need for multiple layers of protection, particularly for system software, was clearly recognized. The case today in the 1990s is even more pressing, when sharing of information, data and programs is required in any information system, as that sharing of information becomes widely distributed geographically and sharing of computational resources, including application client/server programming, introduces broad-grained, loose, coupled parallelism to computing.
The DEC VAX 11/780 Experience and Extension to the Alpha Central Processing Unit
The results of the Multics work can be clearly seen in the DEC VAX 11/780 development with the first computers being shipped in 1978. The structure of this computer called for four processor modes, as follows:
(1) Kernel. Used by the kernel of the operating system for page management, scheduling, and I/O drivers. (2) Executive. Used for many of the operating system service calls, including the record management system. (3) Supervisor. Used for such services as command interpretation. (4) User. Used for user-level code, utilities, compilers, debuggers, etc. [2] . Similarly the concept of protection of memory at the segment level, as per Multics (and later in the Intel X86 processors), manifested itself in the VAX with every page being protected according to usage. It became even possible for a program to be prohibited from reading its own binary code such that a "program may also be prohibited from reading or modifying portions of perprocess space" [2] . It is interesting to contemplate that if this feature of the Intel X86 processor family had been fully utilized in PC-level operating systems from the 286 onwards, the threat of computer viruses would have been markedly reduced, on the simple principle that for a computer virus to propagate it must first read itself as data.
It is interesting to compare the above with the str uctures available in the later DEC Alpha computer [3] . With this particular computer, protection services offered may be dynamic. For example, if the DEC OSF/1 operating system is to be used as the operating system of choice then processor access modes are restricted to "two processor modes, user and kernel". However, in DEC OpenVMS operation, the Alpha processor has "four protection modes" in line with the earlier VAX 11/780 str ucture. The question must be asked as to whether or not, fifteen years after the VAX, the Alpha offer superior security technology for the protection of operating systems and user applications in a distributed computing environment.
In OSF mode the answer appears to be that security structures available have actually been downgraded over VMS systems. Indeed, the Alpha computer poses a more basic question as to whether or not so-called RISC computers meet the security requirements of information systems in the 1990s and beyond. Finally, it is interesting to note that in the preface to his book, Sites, one of two "principal architects" for the processor, makes no mention at all of security requirements even though a "15-25-year design horizon (longevity)" is proposed for the computer [3] . This is an amazing, but unfortunately not surprising, omission!
Intel X86 Computer Protection Structures
The Intel 80386 exemplifies, along with its predecessor, the Intel 80286, and the later 80486 and Pentium processors, a hardware support design for overall system security based around the Multics experience. This design very closely mirrors the security design set out in the late 1960s as a result of research into operating system and computer security that formed part of the MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Multics project as discussed above.
The "386" chip utilizes the basic four level or "rings" of security, as identified in the Multics project, as a subset, and implements them as a part of the computer architecture, along with protection of memory on a page and segment basis, as follows, from the Intel component data sheet:
The 80386 has four levels of protection which are optimised to support the needs of a multi-tasking operating system to isolate and protect user programs from each other and the operating system. The privilege levels control the use of privileged instructions, I/O instructions, and access to segments and segment descriptors. .... The 80386 offers an additional type of protection on a page basis, when paging is enabled [4] . Figure 1 illustrates possible usage of the four layers of protection. Levels of "privilege" or trust are numbered from zero (0) to three (3) . Level zero is the most trusted in that it permits any program operating at that level to perform all hardware operations available to the computer. Thus any program at this level must be highly "trusted" to perform only those functions that it is meant to perform and in a reliable and consistent manner. The computer will not itself protect programs at this level. Level three is the least privileged level or is used to contain programs that cannot be trusted at all, e.g. enduser programs.
Essentially the most privileged or trusted level, privilege level (PL) 0, belongs to the kernel of the operating system, particularly the so-called "security kernel", that basic part of the operating system charged with all activities related to the protection, availability and integrity of computing functions and referred to as the "trusted computing base (TCB)". System services, including hosted operating systems themselves, could be placed at level 1, the next level up the chain. Various service extensions, particularly those related to the connection of the computer to a distributed data network, could be set at level 2 while, as indicated above, application programs run at level 3 and require the most in monitoring and control.
This architecture had been created even earlier, in the design of the Intel iAPX-286 (or simply 286) microprocessor chip, the basis of the IBM PC-AT personal computer. It was included and extended in the Intel 386 chip. The 286 chip was outlined at the time in a number of publications (including [5] and [6] ). The usage of the 4-layer scheme is described by Morse as follows:
The designers of the 286 envisaged that privilege level 1 would be used for most of the operating system. Level 0 would be used for that small portion of the operating system devoted to memory management, protection, and access control. This portion is called the security kernel. All security-related functions are concentrated in the security kernel, which is protected from the rest of the operating system. The security kernel should be designed so that if it is completely secure, then the operating system is also secure. Security should hold despite any mischief in parts of the operating system outside the security kernel [6] .
Thus the 4-level protection architecture provided what Intel described as "the notion of a hierarchy of trust" [5] . Moreover, Intel went on in 1983 to make the following point about such security architecture:
This 4-level scheme offers system reliability, flexibility, and design options not possible with the typical 2-level (supervisor/user) separation provided by other processors. A 4-level division is capable of separating kernel, executive, system services, and application software, each with different privileges… Operating system implementors have found that a multilevel approach to system services provides better security and more reliable systems… [5] .
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Defining Distributed Computing Systems
In discussing distributed computing systems it is best to clarify the concepts involved. Often the concept of open and distributed systems becomes "fuzzy". In a hierarchical sense the combination of separate computers into a network of computers may be separated into several types of architectures. These may be broadly summarized as follows: 
Computer
Source: [4] q centralized services (offering computing and information services on a centralized computer through connection of remote, usually nonintelligent user terminals, possible at very high speed with video and audio capabilities).
This article considers the first of these broad types of information system, i.e. the distributed computing system. Such systems may also comply with standards such that they could also be considered to be "open" and thus qualify as "open and distributed" information systems. The "Open Software Foundation" (OSF) has defined the "distributed computing environment" (DCE) as one that provides "services and tools that support the creation, use and maintenance of distributed applications in a heterogeneous computing environment" [7] . Applications may be seen as "co-operating" across different computers in a computer network, possibly providing highly parallel performance of different algorithms.
Distributed computing moves responsibility for the secure operation of a user program/application out of the province of a single computer and its associated operating system and gives that responsibility to multiple computers and to the data communications protocols and services that interconnect those computers. Moreover, the legal and administrative responsibility for individual host computers in the network may not reside in one enterprise. This is radically different to the past where a user program could be created with a full understanding of the protection afforded by the computer and operating system on which it would operate and the security management environment of the organization responsible for that computer. Thus protection of this distributed computing environment becomes of paramount concern in any enterprise information system or cross-enterprise information sharing process.
DCE offers an associated "DCE security service" in the OSF model which provides "secure communications and controlled access to resources in the distributed system" [7] .These requirements apply to all such distributed applications, whether they be user written or are supplied as subsystems, e.g. network oriented file systems, print servers, etc. The OSF DCE concept is based around the concept of the "remote procedure call"
(RPC) which is in turn based around a "client/server" model of distributed application programs. The RPC concept mirrors the idea of the widely familiar "procedure call" whereby a programmer defines a specific function required, a procedure or subroutine, and the calling interface to that procedure whereby other parts of a program may use it. This is extended to make the placement of the calling procedure and the called procedure possible in different computers in a network. The aim is to make distributed computer applications conceptually simple to programming staff.
However, there is a major problem here. The normal procedure call familiar to programmers makes the basic assumption that the calling process will be protected by the operating system and computer hardware on which the associated application program is operating. This is no longer true in the distributed case.
DCE sets out four additional security services that must be present to establish and maintain secure communications between the parts (clients and servers) of a distributed application. These services are the: (1) authentication service; (2) privilege service; (3) registry service; and (4) access control list facility. These services, however, must themselves operate in real computers and thus must depend upon the trustworthiness of the host computer and its operating system, i.e. "pervasive" security must exist first in order to allow for the distributed security services to be defined and provided. Once a client and a server section of a distributed application have established communication, securely, then each actual instance of a remote procedure call must itself be secure every time it is issued from the client to the server or vice-versa. This means that the client and server must separately incorporate security services which allow the authenticity, integrity and privacy of every transaction to be maintained.
Thus, host operating systems, participating in a distributed computing environment, must provide the associated security services needed to protect these DCE services themselves. In general this means that an extension to a normal operating system is necessary in the form of secure network services that provide for both system and application processes to be generated, transmitted and used. A simple two-state computer (supervisor and user states) appears insufficient to meet this requirement.
Protection Rings and Distributed Computing
A "protection ring" structure is ideally suited to the requirements of open and distributed computer systems where the classic "one-operating system, many time-Distributed computing shifts responsibility to multiple computers shared users on one computer" has given way to a "multidimensional" protection requirement. Computers participating in a computer network and providing distributed computing services, such as "client-server"/ parallel computing applications capabilities, require dynamic extensions to the operating system as network services are created and relinquished in a dynamic fashion. Moreover, unless the totality of security enforcement is entrusted to actual applications themselves and thus is incorporated into application source code, the RPC structures invoked must provide appropriate and continuous security functions in an evaluated context.
In the single computer case it is not usual for an application programmer to provide security functions in both the calling program and the called procedure. The pathway between the "main" program and the called "procedure" is trusted. There is no need for either program part to provide:
q integrity checks, e.g. through use of checksumming routines;
q authenticity checks, e.g. through encrypted checksumming routines that provide the integrity function as well as verifying the identity of the calling process; or q privacy functions, e.g. by encrypting all data (partameters) passed between the calling and called processes. However, all three of these services are required in the DCE/RPC case.
The DCE security extensions provide for these services through the use of encryption, as stated in [7] as follows:
The authentication and authorization information that is sent over the network is all encrypted so that only the intended recipients are able to decrypt and read the messages. If desired, the application data can be encrypted as well. This prevents any unauthorized user from being able to read data that is sent over the network [7] .
However, this concept makes some radical assumptions about the pervasive security that exists in each client or server program host computer. The use of cryptography for integrity, authenticity and privacy purposes assumes that the associated key(s) are protected at all times, even if they are changed regularly on the basis of a computing "session" between a client and a server. The keys must be stored securely in the host computer system and their usage, to perform decryption and like services, must likewise be protected. Unless specialized encryption hardware is provided in every computer in the network for key storage, management and encryption functions, then the multiple-level protection hardware structures discussed above are absolutely necessary to protect any encryption/decryption algorithms that may be implemented in software form.
In particular, this applies to the "stub" that is created to interface the network to the distributed application, and thus to any distributed system services using the RPC construction itself.
Security/Protection and "Microkernel" Operating System Structures and Concepts
A further development in operating system structures must also be considered. An interesting, but potentially highly insecure, operating system structure concept from the early to mid-1980s has taken on new popularity among computer and system software manufacturers. The concept is that of the "microkernel" as demonstrated by the Mach project from Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) in Pennsylvania, USA [8] . Microkernel architectures refer to the basic or fundamental set of primitive functions required to create a full service operating system for a modern computer. These functions, once identified, may be separated from "higher-level" operating system services that may be separately provided. The creation, then, of such a microkernel that incorporates just the basic necessary functions, means that such a base could, for example, host other operating systems as if they were "applications" to that basic OS kernel.
Rashid [8] explains the basic Mach operating system philosophy as:
( q client/server; q pipelining; q asynchronous exceptions; (5) User-tasks perform traditional operating system functions (e.g. file system, network access). The Mach project had the associated goals of supporting various microprocessors (RISC, CISC) as well as multiprocessor systems of various designs and sizes combined with a "restructuring of UNIX-like systems" [8] . An important concept here was the creation of a single software base for different processor hardware architectures such that, as Rashid points out, the following were achievable aims:
q same kernel abstractions on many machine types; q same kernel source on all machines; q same kernel binary on compatible architectures [8] .
However, nowhere in the above broad philosophy and architecture, does overall system security, in the form of confidentiality, integrity and availability, take any significant part. Indeed in the whole Mach project it would appear that little to no consideration was given to this vital topic, in terms of security functionality and evaluation criteria, during design or experimentation. While secure interprocess communication was considered, Rashid admits that "future challenges" include "extending security throughout system design" [8] . The important point here is the term "design", not just implementation. Indeed security is shown in the Mach project architecture as an external service equivalent to the various operating systems that Mach hosts as "applications", as shown in Figure 2 .
The question that must be asked is whether or not such an approach is one that meets the security requirements of information systems in the 1990s and beyond. A "microkernel" is not a "security kernel". As a matter of fact it would appear that the 15 years or more of research into such structures as "security kernels" has had little to no impact on the microkernel concept.
Essentially a security kernel architecture isolates security relevant functions to the kernel part of the operating system for protection and for verification of correct and reliable operation. Moreover, the principle of security is one that matches the operating system and the security features of the processor hardware in a consistent and verifiable manner. This was clearly stated and supported by S. Fuller, the then Vice-President for Research and Architecture at Digital Equipment Corporation, in the foreword to Leonard's book on VAX architecture [2] . He stated, in relation to the operating systems made available for the VAX, that customers can choose among three operating systems, namely:
q VMS, Digital's operating system designed to take full advantage of the VAX architecture;
q ULTRIX, an implementation of the industrystandard UNIX operating system; and q ELN, a system designed to support the development of dedicated, real-time applications [2] . In other words, and as quite clearly stated by DEC, the operating system must correctly utilize the features, and thus the security hardware, of the CPU and in turn, such security hardware must match the security needs of the operating system. This can be seen from the Multics, DEC VAX-11/780 and Intel experiences, as examples. The idea that a single operating system "core", such as the microkernel, should be moved, in toto and without change, from processor to processor, irrespective of the underlying specific architectural structures and security hardware features of the processor, is simply wrong.
Trusted Mach -TMach
The above problems with the Mach concepts were recognized some time ago and a project to markedly increase the security of the Mach kernel was established in the USA through Trusted Information Systems Inc. (TIS). The approach taken by TIS [9] may be summarized as follows:
q incorporation of basic security mechanisms in the kernel;
q primary security enforcing functions implemented via servers;
q centralized mediation in the name server; q separation of mediation and enforcement; q server interaction to provide security functionality. In particular the TMach project, in placing the security mechanisms in the kernel, where they belong, also sets out support for "protection layers" in such a "trusted computing base" (TCB). In particular, the TMach project aims at evaluation for both security functionality and confidence at the TCSEC B2/B3 levels, enabling its usage where secure multi-level security requirements exist for information systems.
It may be argued that this level of security, i.e. in the B1/B2 area, is exactly what is needed in distributed systems given that interconnection of multiple computers into a data network means that multiple-level security requirements clearly exist across the data network. The question is whether or not the Mach kernel concept is suitable and appropriate for usage in the distributed systems environment of the 1990s. TMach appears to answer these questions [10] .
Conclusions
The distributed computing environment makes new demands on the operating systems and hardware bases of the computers that participate in the distributed computer network. In particular, the emerging OSF DCE and its associated remote procedure call or RPC construction places requirements for advanced protection of such services on every computer that participates in the network. While DCE security services are defined at the network level these services require that dynamic structures, such as user application program "stubs" at the client and server levels in an application, be created, distributed and maintained securely. Moreover, every invocation of the RPC must itself be protected and meet security requirements of authenticity, integrity, privacy and availability.
Extensive work is needed to analyse current and proposed operating system structures that are required to support the distributed computing environment, and their interaction with and full support and use of underlying computer protection hardware, in order to build confidence in the protection of distributed application systems and related systems services such as network file servers, print services, name servers, etc. The security services proposed for the OSF DCE environment, for example, require sophisticated security technology at the individual host level in order to have guaranteed protection of the services offered and the associated cryptographic techniques used.
Clear architectural directions for protection, such as the Multics project, were established in the computer industry almost 30 years ago in the mid-1960s but the question must be asked as to whether or not the research performed and results obtained have been incorporated into the computer systems of the 1990s and into the twenty-first century.
